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Securities Trading in the Absence of Dealers: 
Trades and Quotes on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the behavior of intraday trades and quotes for individual stocks on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). The TSE has no designated market makers and is further 
distinguished by daily and intraday price limits and conversion to limit orders of market order 
portions that exceed the size of the current quote. We examine the transaction and quote record 
for three firms for the first three months of 1990. Our findings suggest that the immediacy 
available (at least for small trades) in the market is high, despite the reliance on public limit orders 
to supply liquidity. When orders that would otherwise walk through the limit order book are 
converted into limit orders, execution is delayed, but some orders execute (at least in part) at 
more favorable prices. Holding order size constant, orders that are delayed in this fashion appear 
to have a larger information content. Finally, as a consequence of limit order cancellation and 
autocorrelation in arriving orders, the bid (offer) quote tends to deteriorate further after a sale 
(purchase). 
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While the initial surge in empirical analyses of market structure centered on U.S. markets in 
general and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in particular, interest is now shifting toward 
markets with more diverse structural features. This paper analyzes the behavior of intraday trades 
and quotes on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). One of the largest exchanges in the world, the 
TSE certainly possesses size sufficient to warrant interest. It is also characterized, however, by a 
number of distinctive institutional features. 
Most importantly, the trading mechanism at the TSE does not rely on designated dealers or 
market-makers. All liquidity is supplied by traders who submit limited price and market orders. 
Furthermore, by custom and convention, members refrain from placing proprietary limit orders on 
both sides of the market (although they can represent customers on both sides of the market). 
This effectively prevents a group of traders that would naturally gravitate toward functioning as 
de facto dealers from doing so.1 In most markets, dealers are responsible for maintaining quotes 
and liquidity. By examining the TSE, this study seeks to determine the extent to which this 
function is met by public traders. The central role of the limit order book also characterizes open 
limit order book systems: the Toronto CATS system and the CAC system used for high-volume stocks 
on the Paris Bourse. The latter is discussed by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (BHS, 1994). 
The TSE is also distinctive in its implementation of market order procedures and price limits. 
These may cause a delayed adjustment of quotes, effectively closing one or both sides of the 
market for brief periods, and may also introduce delays for orders which involve price changes. 
In contrast with the continuity rules of the NYSE, however, there is no requirement that actual 
trades occur at the intermediate prices to bridge the gap. This study seeks to determine the extent 
to which the price continuity rules are binding and characterize the delays. 
A number of papers have dealt with various aspects of the TSE: Amihud and Mendelson 
(1989, 1991, 1993), George and Hwang (1994), Hamao (1992), Kato (1990), Lindsey and 
Schaede (1992), Takagi (1993) and Japan Securities Research Institute (1990). Lehmann and 
Modest (1994) examine, as does the present paper, the intraday behavior of trades and quotes. 
Their study provides a detailed cross-sectional view of return and liquidity characteristics based 
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on a comprehensive sample of TSE firms. Our paper attempts to achieve a more detailed 
description of the dynamics of trades and quotes for a few representative firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 summarizes trading procedures on 
the TSE. Section 2 describes the data. The next two sections provide the main results on 
liquidity. Section 3 discusses preliminary findings on price limits and liquidity. The dynamic 
properties of trades and quotes are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents concluding 
remarks. 
1. Institutional Details. 
This section summarizes the key institutional features of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 
and is based on the published rules of the Exchange (TSE (1993a, 1993b)) and conversations with 
Exchange personnel. The TSE is by far the dominant market in the trading of Japanese equities. 
Among all Japanese firms, the vast majority have their primary listing on the TSE. Although 
many stocks are cross-listed on regional exchanges (the largest of which is in Osaka), the TSE 
accounts for most of the trading. In the year of our data sample (1990), 84% of the share volume 
in all Japanese equities was conducted on the TSE (TSE (1993c)). 
A stock is listed either in the first section, which contains approximately 1200 large and 
actively traded stocks, or in the second section (approximately 400 smaller, less actively traded 
stocks.)2 All stocks in the second section and most in the first section (including all three stocks 
in our sample) are "system-traded" with the assistance of a computerized matching system termed 
(in English) CORES (Computerized Order Routing and Execution System). Procedures for these 
stocks are substantially, but not entirely, automated. The remaining stocks in the first section 
(150 actively traded issues) are "floor-traded". Trading in these issues is conducted with a higher 
degree of human involvement. For both schemes, however, the trading rules are essentially 
identical: the only difference is whether these rules are implemented with more automation 
(system-traded) or less (floor-traded). 
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All trading takes place under the supervision of a saitori Exchange member. The saitori is 
neither a broker nor a dealer: he neither represents customer orders nor does he trade for his own 
account. The saitori governs the trading process in floor-traded stocks and also (although with 
lesser involvement) in system-traded stocks. For the latter, the saitori plays an active 
discretionary role in certain situations described in detail below. Tick sizes are summarized in 
Table 1. They depend on the stock price and are generally between one-tenth and one percent of 
the stock price. 
The trading day on the TSE is divided into morning (9:00 AM to 11:00 AM) and afternoon 
sessions (1:00 PM to 3:00 PM in our sample, 12:30 PM to 3:00 PM since April 1991). A trading 
session on the TSE opens with a call mechanism {itayose), then functions as a continuous double 
auction (zaraba) until the session closes. In principle, the session may close with a call if there are 
both buy and sell market-on-close orders, or if the market-on-close orders on one side of the 
market exceed the (nearest-priced) limit orders on the other side, but this seldom occurs. 
The itayose mechanism is straightforward. Buyers and sellers submit market or limited price 
orders which are cumulated into supply and demand schedules. The intersection determines the 
equilibrium (see Hamao (1992)). After the itayose clears, the best unexecuted buy and sell orders 
establish the bid and ask price for the start of the zaraba. Within the zaraba, traders may submit 
limit orders or market orders. The regular quotes (ippan kehai) disseminated by the Exchange 
represent the best bid and ask in the limit order book, and most incoming market orders execute 
by hitting the book. The size of the reported trade is determined by the size of the incoming 
order. A 1,000 share buy order that executes at one price against limit sell orders of 600 and 400 
shares, for example, is reported as a 1,000 share trade. 
The principal complication in this-framework is the procedure that slows the execution of 
large market orders. These, for present purposes, are market orders that cannot be fully executed 
at the current quote, i.e., orders that would otherwise "walk" through the limit order book. When 
such an order arrives, it partially executes up to the size of the current quote. Then the remaining 
portion is converted into a limit order at the current quote. This is briefly displayed as an 
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indicative quote, an invitation for competing liquidity suppliers to hit the quote. If no such orders 
arrive, the original order is allowed to proceed to the next price in the book. 
Table 2 describes an extended example. For a share price just above ¥1,500, the tick size is 
¥10. Suppose that the opening itayose price (or previously executed price in zaraba) is ¥1,540 
(time 0). The subsequent limit order book is that shown at time 1. The highest bid and lowest 
offer are displayed as regular quotes. Transaction price limits are most often hit when large 
incoming orders walk up or down the book. Suppose that a 10,000 share market buy order 
arrives at time 2. The first portion of this order, 9,000 shares, is traded immediately at the 
prevailing offer (time 3). 
The remaining 1,000 shares is not, however, immediately executed at the next higher price 
(¥1,560). Instead, the order is represented as a warning bid (kai chui kehai) at ¥1,550. The 
warning quote is generally issued automatically, but the saitori may instruct the system to 
suppress this generation. The duration of the warning quote is also at the discretion of the saitori, 
but for an order in this situation would typically be less than one minute. If this waiting period 
elapses without the arrival of a sell order priced at the market, ¥1,550 or lower, the remainder of 
the market order is allowed to hit the ¥1,560 offer on the book (time 4). 
This process can be repeated at each step of the price, moving one tick at a time. The 
unexecuted portion of a market order is effectively converted to a limit order, in a fashion similar 
to that employed in the French CAC system (see BHS). However, unlike the CAC system where 
a market order in excess of the best quote on the opposite side is converted to a limit order, the 
market order is eventually permitted to hit the next higher price on the TSE. The handling of a 
TSE market order therefore lies between that of a CAC market order and a CAC marketable limit 
order (which is allowed to walk-through the book without delay). 
Transaction prices on the TSE are also subject to maximum variation limits. Hamao (1992) 
describes the daily price limits, which are relatively broad. As it happened, none of our stocks hit 
a daily price limit, despite the high activity and volatility in the sample. Table 1 reports the 
Page 5 
intraday price variation limits. These depend on the stock price and are generally between one and 
two percent of the stock price (alternatively, between two and ten ticks). 
The intraday price limits are often triggered within the day by the arrival of orders of opposite 
sign. For a stock in the price range of the example the maximum price variation is ¥30 (cf. Table 
1). Suppose that a 2,000 share market sell order arrives at time 5. If this were permitted to hit 
the bid (¥1,520), the resulting change from the previous price (¥1,560) would exceed permitted 
variation (¥30). A warning quote is also used in this situation, an offer at ¥1,550 (time 6). At this 
point, an execution can only result from the arrival of a market buy order (which would execute at 
¥1,550) or a limit buy order priced at ¥1,530 or better (which would execute at the limit price). If 
neither order arrives, the warning quote may remain at ¥1,550 (possibly for the remainder of the 
trading session). Alternatively, the saitori may successively revise the warning offer, down to the 
price consistent with the maximum permitted variation (¥1,530). The saitori exercises 
considerable judgment in this situation as there are no formal Exchange rules governing warning 
quotes. In the example, the arrival of a buy order priced at ¥1,530 at time 9 triggers an execution 
(reported at time 10). In the absence of any order arrivals, the warning quote would not be 
lowered below ¥1,530. 
Saitori discretion in the use of warning quotes extends to the exposure duration. A warning 
quote is sometimes allowed to persist for several minutes. When an incoming market order is 
progressing through the limit order book, on the other hand, the warning quote is often exposed 
only momentarily. This does not allow the trader who had entered the exposed limit order a 
broad opportunity to revise or cancel the order. 
The warning quote mechanism effectively imposes on TSE traders a particular strategy. BHS 
note that when the spread on the Paris Bourse is relatively high, incoming orders are less likely to 
demand liquidity (seek immediate execution) and are more likely to compete by successively 
improving on the prevailing quote (and narrowing the spread). The warning quote process 
mimics this quote improvement process. It removes, however, the trader's discretion in the 
duration of the quotes and (implicitly) the aggressiveness of the order. Also, although a warning 
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quote may stop trading for an indeterminate time, the order underlying the quote is not "stopped" 
in the sense of the term on the NYSE. A broker stopping an order on the NYSE guarantees 
execution at a particular price and seeks to improve upon that price. There is no such guarantee 
on the TSE, as it is conceivable that the opposing quote could deteriorate while the warning quote 
was pending. 
Warning quotes are an informal indication of buying or selling interest. A more formal 
indication is the "special quote" (tokubetsu kehai). A special quote arises in situations similar to 
those that trigger a warning quote, but with multiple orders on the active side. In the example, 
had another seller arrived at time 6, a special offer quote of ¥1,550 would have been 
disseminated. Whereas warning quotes are bound by the maximum permitted price variation, a 
special quote effectively resets the base price. The hypothetical special quote of ¥1,550 at time 6 
would be consistent with a subsequent execution price down to ¥1,520 (¥1,550 less ¥30). The 
saitori must allow a special quote to persist for at least five minutes (or until it is hit). If it is not 
hit, the special quote may be revised up to maximum variation (¥30), i.e., the new special quote is 
¥1,520. After five more minutes have passed without the arrival of an opposing order, the quote 
may be revised again, and so on up to the daily price limit. 
When a special quote is posted, the opposing quote is removed from display (actually, posted 
as zero). In the example, if a special offer quote of ¥1,550 had been posted at time 6, the ¥1,520 
bid would have been removed from the display, and a '00' null quote (our terminology) would 
have been shown. It is in this instance impossible for a seller to determine if the ¥1,520 bid has 
been canceled. In discussing this procedure, TSE personnel note that when an order imbalance of 
this sort exists, the bid quote tends to be in small size. The TSE therefore views the bid (the size 
of which is not widely disseminated) as a -misleading indicator of the price a seller might receive, 
and elects not to display it at all. As a formal matter, this removal effectively converts a double-
sided open auction to an auction that is sealed-bid on one side. These null quotes are also used 
when the underlying order is far out of range. 
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The gradual and progressive revision of quotes on the TSE is mandated with a view 
toward smoothing the price transition path and reducing the impact of transient liquidity shock.:, 
On the NYSE, this purpose is served primarily by price continuity rules, and it is illuminating to 
compare the two approaches. The contrasting features may be summarized as follows. Suppose 
that the market is hit by a large public information shock that necessitates a price adjustment. On 
the TSE, the quotes will exhibit a smooth transition path, but there need not be any transactions 
along this path. Successive transaction prices may be widely separated. On the NYSE, the 
specialist (designated market maker) is partially evaluated on the extent to which he maintains 
transaction price continuity, i.e., limits successive price changes to one tick. In providing this 
continuity, the specialist may engage in trades that are disadvantageous relative to the current 
available information. A further distinction between the two exchanges lies in the time needed to 
complete the transition. On the TSE, adjustment of the quotes may necessitate intervals of 
waiting at the intermediate price levels. On the NYSE, there are no restrictions on the adjustment 
speed (in natural time): the transactions establishing the adjustment may be executed within 
seconds of each other.3 
Although most transactions result from the interaction of two anonymous orders, the TSE 
does permit a broker to effect a cross. Rules for large block trading were streamlined in 1967 
when off-exchange block trading was prohibited in most circumstances. (There are, however, 
some rarely-encountered situations in which it is permissible.) Block trades crossed on the 
Exchange must clear the limit order book and are fully subject to all TSE rules. The regional 
exchanges (Osaka, in particular) play a role in block trading that is similar to that of the regional 
exchanges in the U.S. Because there is less trading activity, it is easier for a broker to cross a 
block away from the primary exchange: spreads are generally wider and there are fewer limit 
orders to be "cleaned up". Off-TSE block trading is highly seasonal. A March peak arises from a 
fiscal-year-end trading practice in which a single institutional stockholder may be on both sides of 
the trade, thereby resetting the value of the holdings (for financial reporting purposes) to current 
market value. 
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The TSE is also distinctive in the level of information permitted to the various classes of 
participants. Table 3 summarizes market participants and their access to information and order 
entry facilities. Of particular note is the relatively narrow dissemination given to quotes. Away 
from the Exchange floor, quote sizes are available only for system-traded stocks and only at the 
member firm's lead office. Participants without this information cannot know the depth of the 
market. The practice of converting a partially executed order to a warning quote can be viewed 
as a way of compensating for this lack of transparency. Off-exchange, warning quotes are 
available only at lead or branch offices of member firms, and electronic collection or rebroadcast 
of any data is strictly prohibited. 
A member may install in the trading room at his lead office video display terminals that show 
for system-traded stocks the shape of the order book (prices and quantities, but not identities) 
both prior to the itayose (opening call) and during the zaraba (continuous trading). These 
terminals also report the largest cumulative traders (identified by member firm). The number of 
terminals is limited, and the information is supplied only on demand, in response to a request 
entered on a keyboard: it is not continuously updated. This information is also available for 
floor-traded issues, but only by inspection of a screen on the Exchange floor. The information 
may not be electronically copied or rebroadcast. The only-on-demand feature and the electronic 
capture prohibition effectively nullify the usefulness of these data as inputs to a real-time 
automated trading system. 
It is especially noteworthy that the information available at the member's lead office includes 
the total size of the orders underlying a warning or special quote. In principle a trader deciding 
whether or not to hit a warning or special quote can condition on the total size of the order. 
While this is a distinct possibility, there are some practical limitations. Since the progression of 
the warning or special quotes may be rapid and the information is available only on demand, a 
trader may not always have sufficient time to react. If the response would involve modifying a 
customer order, additional delay would be introduced by need to confer with the customer. 
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For floor-traded issues, customer order are relayed by telephone to a member on the 
exchange floor. Except for small and pre-opening orders (see Table 3), the member orally 
communicates the order to the saitori who then enters it in the floor-trading computer system. 
For system-traded issues, all customer orders must be routed through the member's lead office. 
The order is entered at a terminal in the member firm's lead office, which electronically transmits 
the order to CORES. 
The links between the TSE and the regional exchanges are not as formalized as those 
governing the U.S. Intermarket Trading System. Trade reporting is consolidated (as in the U.S.), 
but there is no consolidated quote reporting. It is the broker's responsibility to survey the quotes 
and to determine how to route an order. Exchange officials claim that while trade-throughs 
(execution at a price inferior to another exchange's posted bid or offer) are possible, they rarely 
occur. For a stock that trades principally on the TSE, the price limit mechanism is applied to TSE 
trading without formally taking into account transactions occuring at other exchanges. The other 
exchanges, however, are responsible for ensuring that their trades do not violate the TSE price 
limits. The roles are reversed for a stock that trades primarily on a regional exchange. 
2. Data and Preliminary Analysis. 
The data sample underlying this study consists of the ordered sequence of transactions and 
quotes for three securities in the period January 4, 1990 through March 31, 1990, time-stamped 
to the last minute. The quotes (regular, warning and special) show only prices, not quantities. 
We do not observe the orders directly, and the data do not contain limit orders away from the best 
quotes. As noted above, the regular quotes are the best (narrowest) quotes that have not been 
executed at a given time. Our database essentially reflects the information available at a member 
firm's branch office (see Table 3), and our analysis will implicitly take this as the relevant public 
information set. Traders at the member firm's lead office may also have access (by request) to 
data describing the shape of the limit order book and the identity of the initiators of large executed 
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transactions. This roughly corresponds to the information available to a member on the floor of 
the NYSE. 
The data were provided by the Exchange in the form of photostat computer printouts 
(roughly 5,000 pages), converted into machine-readable form using an optical scanner, checked 
and edited. The securities, randomly chosen from system-traded issues in the first section, are: 
Mitsui Construction, Nikon and Japan Airlines (JAL). There were 59 trading days in this period. 
January 4, 1990 was the first trading day of the year, and the market was open only in the 
morning. Due to mishaps in the collection of the data, we are missing one day for each stock 
(February 27 for Nikon and JAL, and March 2 for Mitsui Construction). This leaves 58 morning 
sessions and 57 afternoon sessions. 
Figure 1 depicts the daily closing prices over the observation period. All three stocks in our 
sample declined in value. (The Tokyo market experienced a downward movement; the closing 
value of the value-weighted Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) declined from 2,867.70 on 
January 4 to 2,227.48 on March 30.) Table 4 reports various summary statistics. At then-current 
exchange rates, the median transaction sizes roughly correspond to dollar values of $21,000 
(Mitsui Construction), $36,000 (Nikon), and $26,000 (JAL). Average spreads are very close to 
their respective minimum tick size, and are 1% or less. For each stock, the tick size remained 
constant over the sample period. 
Nikon and Japan Air Lines are also traded on the regional exchanges; Mitsui Construction 
trades only on the TSE. While we do not possess market share data covering our sample period, 
we have examined off-TSE trading activity for the first quarter of the following year (1991). The 
TSE's share of trading volume for the quarter was 82% for Nikon and 95% for Japan Air Lines. 
These stocks further exhibited the seasonal pattern mentioned in Section 1. The monthly shares 
for January, February and March were 98%, 83% and 76% for Nikon, and 98%, 94% and 94% 
for JAL. 
As in the U.S. data, most market statistics exhibit a marked intradaily pattern.4 Figures 2, 3 
and 4 present plots of average squared return, average proportional spread, and average trading 
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volume for fifteen-minute intervals throughout the trading day. The mean squared return and 
spread tend to be elevated at the beginning and end of the trading day. The volume tends to be 
elevated at the beginning and end of the trading sessions.5 
3. The Availability of Immediacy. 
A trader enjoys immediacy in a market when an order can be instantaneously executed. 
Speed of execution may be important for reasons of hedging, implementation of dynamic trading 
strategies, minimization of ongoing market monitoring costs, or simply an investor's desire for 
closure on an allocation decision. When an exchange's procedures require a market maker to 
post quotes at all times, immediacy is available at some price whenever the market is open. In the 
absence of such a dealer (as on the TSE), immediacy will be unavailable whenever there is no 
public limit offer to buy or sell. In addition, the TSE's procedures for handling large market 
orders and the intraday price limits may also impair immediacy. This section examines the 
evidence bearing on the availability of immediacy and also the execution delays introduced by the 
order procedures. 
By way of preliminaries, Table 5 summarizes the number and relative durations of times when 
immediacy is unavailable on one or both sides of the market. A relative duration is the total time 
that immediacy was impaired as a percentage of the time that the TSE was in principle open over 
our sample period. The greatest impairment of liquidity is associated with opening delays: the 
highest relative duration in our sample of firms is 7.5% (of the total time the Exchange was open). 
These stem from a relatively small number of instances when the opening delay was on the order 
of an hour. It is not possible to ascertain when no bid or offer exists in the system. The "null" 
quote category (a relative duration of at most 1.4% in our sample) includes this possibility, but 
null quotes are also posted when the opposing quote is a special bid or offer. Price variation 
events are those in which a quote is posted, but hitting such a quote would violate the maximum 
permitted intraday price variation (a relative duration of at most 1.8% in our sample). Finally, 
times in which an order is in progress on the same side of the market (as indicated by a warning or 
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special quote) account for a relative duration of up to 1.3% in our sample. Although these 
relative durations may appear small, they do not take into account the demand for liquidity. The 
market may be effectively unavailable exactly when the demand for liquidity is high. 
While it would obviously be desirable to track the performance of all incoming orders, these 
are not contained in our data. Partial inference is possible, however, from the transaction and 
quote record. To this end we define an order sequence as the consecutive sequence of trade and 
quote events that spans the smallest time for which we can be certain that the order that initiated 
the sequence has been fully processed. The simplest sequence arises when a normal bid and offer 
are present, a transaction takes place at either, and then the normal quotes are reaffirmed. This 
may confidently be presumed to have arisen from an incoming market order. If the order could 
not have been fully executed at one price, however, the sequence would have involved warning 
quotes and multiple transactions. 
More formally, the start of an order sequence in the buy direction is indicated by a transaction 
above the current bid quote or a quote that improves on the current bid. Continuation of the 
order sequence is inferred from warning or special quote conditions. The ending point of an order 
sequence is fixed by the posting of a regular quote, or by the end of the trading session. First 
transactions of both morning and afternoon sessions are excluded since they employ a call auction 
(itayose). Limit orders at or away from the current quote ("passive orders") cannot be discerned 
in our data. Furthermore, the inferred sequence may actually span multiple incoming orders: if 
another order arrives on the same side of the market during a warning or special quote sequence, 
it will not be possible to infer from the reported transactions when the execution of the first order 
is completed and that of the second order has begun. 
In examining the outcomes of orders and order sequences, we are implicitly ignoring the 
endogeneity of order submission strategies. Traders can and do condition their orders on current 
market conditions. In principle, for example, a trader with access to the display at a member's 
lead office can obtain the shape of the limit order book (data we do not possess), and can so 
forecast the progress of trades and warning quotes that would result from an order of a given size. 
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Knowledge that the book is thin may lead the trader to trim the size of the order. This 
conditioning is ignored in our analysis. 
Table 6 describes the order sequences in the sample. The vast majority result from market 
orders that are completed in a single transaction. Quote improvements constitute a smaller 
number of instances. It is useful to categorize sequences of longer than one event according to 
whether the duration of the sequence is longer than one minute (the time resolution of the data). 
Of the multiple-event sequences that start with a trade, roughly half of these (253/547=46%) are 
completed in the same minute. Many of these sequences involve orders that are permitted 
through the book without interference.6 The corresponding figure for multiple-event sequences 
that started with a quote revision is 131/357=37%. All of the multiple-event sequences involved 
warning or special quotes, with the former being more common. In many of these sequences, a 
special or warning quote was hit by an incoming opposing order. 
A one-event sequence that began with a quote revision reflects a regular bid or offer that 
improved on the prevailing bid or offer, and it is reasonable to assume that this was the intent of 
the trader submitting the order. This assumption cannot be made for longer sequences. For 
example, if the offer quote lies beyond the maximum price variation, a market buy order will 
appear as a sequence of warning quotes (some of which may be hit by incoming sell orders). A 
sequence of warning quotes might also arise from a limit order that improves upon the current bid 
by more than one tick. 
Since the warning and special quotes constitute a particularly distinctive feature of the TSE 
mechanism, it is useful to examine the outcomes of these quotes in greater detail. A warning or 
special quote can lead to another revised warning or special quote, a regular quote, a null quote 
(if the order is withdrawn and the next-best order is out of range). The outcome may also be a 
transaction. The special or warning quote may itself be hit by an opposing order. Alternatively, 
the order behind the special or warning quote may be allowed to hit the prevailing counterparty 
quote. Finally, the trading session may close with the quote left hanging. 
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Table 7 reports the frequency of occurrence of these outcomes and also the mean durations. 
The average durations of the warning quotes are brief, under three minutes. These averages 
include, however, many instances where the warning quote was exposed for under one minute. It 
is likely that most of the 755 cases where a warning quote was followed by a trade correspond to 
instances where an order is walking through the book. Nevertheless, 19% of the warning quotes 
(199/1,052) were hit by incoming orders, with a mean duration of 0.66 minutes. This suggests 
that these orders may encourage competing providers of liquidity to come forth. The incidence of 
special quotes is roughly 7% (77/1,052) of that of warning quotes. Since these cannot be revised 
before five minutes have elapsed, the durations are longer than those of warning quotes. 
Nevertheless, in 51% of the occurrences (39/77), the special quote was hit by an incoming order. 
Our sample exhibited no instance of a warning quote in which the opposing quote was 
withdrawn or moved away from the order. The absence of such behavior may reflect the 
irrelevance of opposing warning quotes in limit order strategy or it may simply arise from the 
practical difficulties of detecting and reacting to these quotes. The extent of quote revisions in the 
face of special quotes could not be ascertained because no opposing quotes are displayed. 
Taking the volume of an order sequence and the submission time as predetermined, the 
impact of these variables on the duration of the sequence may be estimated from the regression 
specification: 
where i indexes the order sequences in the sample and the time dummy variables define the 
sixteen 15-minute intervals comprising the trading day (interval 1 is 9:00 to 9:15, etc.) and refer 
to the time of order submission. Table 8 presents estimations of this specification for the three 
firms. The overall explanatory power of the regressions is not large: the i^ 's are all below ten 
percent. This suggests that there are significant determinants of liquidity that are not captured. 
The volume coefficients generally define a positive relation between volume and duration. The 
time dummies are jointly statistically significant. They suggest that liquidity is lower at the 
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beginning of the day. The principal caveat in this regression is the exogeneity assumption. Order 
submission strategy is endogenous to market conditions. The submitted orders depend on the 
expected market depth, and our weak correlations may simply reflect a tendency of traders to 
submit larger orders when the market is more capable of accommodating them. 
4. The Dynamic Behavior of Trades and Quotes. 
This section explores the relations between trades and quotes on the TSE. This behavior is 
of interest because it provides clues about the information contained in trades, and how this 
information is incorporated into prices. We employ two approaches. The first involves a vector 
autoregression model in which trades are characterized solely by their signed volume and the price 
variable of interest is taken to be the quote midpoint. This analysis is well-suited to investigating 
the adjustment process of the quote midpoint, and in particular, how the TSE's price limit 
mechanism affects this adjustment. The second analysis focuses on the behavior of quotes relative 
to the transaction price, with the purpose of characterizing the information contained in the 
trades. 
Trades and Quotes: a Vector Autoregressive Model. 
Applications of vector autoregressions (VARs) in microstructure analysis are described in 
Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b, 1993). A VAR jointly models the dynamic interactions of all 
variables. The key variables here are the revision in the quote midpoint (rt) and the signed trade 
size (xt). These variables and the associated transformations are summarized in Table 9, and are 
essentially identical to those employed by Hasbrouck (1991a) for the NYSE data. The most 
significant departure from the earlier paper involves the time subscript. Here, t refers to minutes 
and not transactions. The motivation for this change stems from the central role played in the 
TSE's price limit mechanism by standard wall-clock time. 
The trade variables (xt and its transformations) attempt to reflect the incoming order flow, 
signed positively for buyer-initiated trades and negatively for seller-initiated trades. We follow the 
conventional practice of imputing this sign by reference to the prevailing quotes. Because all 
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trades except crosses involve the limit order book, the vast majority of the TSE trades can be 
signed in this fashion. 
To capture the state of the market when a price limit is in effect, we construct a signed trade-
pending variable, pendt. This is an indicator variable set to +1 if the pending bid quote at the end 
of minute t is a warning or special quote. This indicates that a buy order is either walking up the 
book or is being held to satisfy the continuity requirements. Similarly, pendt is set to -1 if the 
pending offer quote at the end of minute t is a warning or special quote. 
The VAR for the variable set was estimated with all variables 
included through a ten-minute lag using the specification: 
where the At are conformable coefficient matrices and ut is a disturbance vector. The inclusion of 
the Aozt term on the r.h.s. of (2) reflects a partial recursive structure imposed on the specification: 
the current quote revision is allowed to depend on the current trade variables. The coefficient 
estimates are not reported, as it is more illuminating for present purposes to examine the impulse 
response functions. The impulse response functions characterize the dynamic behavior of the 
system subsequent to an initial shock (assumed value of ut at time /=0). Table 10 reports 
summary estimates of these functions. 
For each firm, we study three initial shocks. The first shock corresponds to a buy order with 
size equal to the 90th percentile transaction size for the firm (200 shares for Mitsui Construction, 
510 shares for Nikon and 50 for JAL). The order-pending variable is set to zero (indicating that 
the order is fully executed as a single transaction). For all three firms the statistically significant 
positive implied cumulative price impact of the trade captures the information effect of the trade.. 
Furthermore, for two of the three firms (Nikon and JAL), the initial order leads to significant 
additional order flow. 
Positive autocorrelation in the order flow has been found for the NYSE by Hasbrouck and 
Ho (1987) and for the Paris Bourse by BHS. As possible economic factors, BHS note the 
possibilities of: strategic order splitting, imitation (momentum trading) and the sequential arrival 
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of orders representing individual trading decisions in response to common information. 
Institutional features may also play a role: price discreteness and (at the NYSE) transaction price 
continuity requirements and fragmentation in the reporting process. The TSE has no reporting 
fragmentation and neither the TSE nor Paris has continuity requirements. Therefore the positive 
trade autocorrelation cannot primarily arise from these considerations. 
The second initial impulse for each firm is identical to the first, except that the order-pending 
variable is set "on". This corresponds to an execution that is followed by a special or warning 
quote, indicating that a portion of the original order is pending. Not surprisingly, this results in a 
large increase in the total cumulative order flow. For Mitsui Construction, for example, the initial 
200 share purchase order gives rise (in expectation) to an additional 91.60 shares. The larger 
order flow is also associated with a larger quote impact. 
It is of some interest to investigate whether the impact of an order on a quote depends on 
whether it is processed as a single trade or as a sequence that involves warning quotes. The first 
two impulse response functions are not directly comparable for this purpose because they 
presumably involve different order sizes. That is, if a trade of 200 shares is followed by a warning 
quote that indicates more is pending, it must be the case that the original order size was for more 
than 200 shares. To make the comparison more meaningful, a third impulse response function 
was computed using an initial impulse corresponding to the total order flow (including that 
induced) from the second impulse calculation, but with the order-pending variable set to zero. 
This roughly corresponds to an order of the same total size as in the second impulse calculation, 
but processed as a single trade. For all three firms, the implied quote impact of this order was 
smaller than the impact when the order was spread out over multiple executions (second impulse 
calculation). In all three cases, this difference was statistically significant. It is also worth 
emphasizing that the lower quote impact in this (third) case is also accompanied by higher 
cumulative signed order flow. 
Special and warning quotes are used when liquidity is relatively low. Liquidity might be low 
because of random order arrival characteristics. In this case, price limits can time-average the 
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arrival of liquidity suppliers and demanders. Alternatively, low liquidity may also signal that 
incoming orders possess an especially large information content, in which case the price limits 
merely retard the incorporation of information into the security price. Since warning and special 
quotes are often hit, they do appear to smooth price movements resulting from transient 
illiquidity. However, since the cumulative quote impact of an order appears to be higher if the 
order is handled as a sequence of trades, it appears that the warning and special quotes also 
impede informationally-based price adjustments. 
Two key findings concerning warning and special quotes may be summarized as follows. 
First, the dynamic analysis suggests that orders for which these quotes are activated have a higher 
information content. Second, the analysis of outcomes noted that special and warning quotes are 
often hit by traders who are effectively bettering the prevailing quote, a response which is rational 
if the order is judged to have a lower information content. These two findings can be reconciled if 
there is conditioning information available to participants not captured in the present analysis. 
One hypothesis involves the size of the order. It was noted in the discussion of the 
institutional features of the TSE that the display terminal at a member's lead office shows the size 
of the orders underlying a warning or special quote. Thus, a trader who was part of the offer side 
of the limit order book and was trying to whether or not to hit a special bid could condition on the 
size of special bid, subject to the time limits imposed by the saitori. Economic considerations 
suggest that the special bid would be more likely to be hit if it were for a relatively small quantity. 
We do not observe the order sizes and so cannot test this mechanism directly. We did, however, 
examine the total trade volumes of order sequences, classified according to whether or not a 
special or warning quote was hit. The results did not strongly support the conjecture that 
sequences with-trades at the special or warning quotes had relatively small sizes. The exact 
nature of the conditioning information therefore remains an open question. 
Trades and Quotes: The Limit Order Book After a Trade. 
In many markets, it is possible for the quote-setter to condition the bid and offer on the full 
size of the incoming trade. This is trivially the case when trade size is restricted to a single 
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magnitude, but also obtains when a single market-maker quotes a price schedule. Many 
theoretical models, including Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) conform 
to this structure. There are also, on the other hand, many markets in which the quote setter or 
limit-order trader does not know the full size of the trade that triggers the order. When the 
quotes derive from a limit order book with many traders, a limit order may be executed in the 
process of filling an order of much greater size. Rock (1994) and Glosten (1994) model markets 
of this latter sort. 
In these models when competitive quote-setters know the full size of the incoming trade, the 
equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost holds for each trade size. The marginal revenue 
associated with a dealer sale, for example, is equal to the marginal cost (the expected terminal 
value of the security conditional on the trade), and there is no ex post regret. When the quote-
setter cannot condition on trade size, however, the equality of marginal cost and revenue holds 
only in expectation across all trade sizes. The equality between the marginal revenue (the price 
received for the last share in the dealer sale) and the revised expectation of the security value is 
broken. In principle, this may lead to revisions in the order book subsequent to a trade that better 
or worsen the quote. In the Paris CAC system, in particular, BHS find limit order cancellations 
subsequent to large trades. On the TSE, however, while the quote setter cannot generally 
condition on the total size of the trade, this may be possible when the trade is represented as a 
warning or special quote. 
To investigate post-trade quote revisions, we define the price-quote continuation after m 
minutes for a buyer-initiated order sequence as: 
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Signed in this fashion, C is positive for a purchase if the revised offer is higher than the last 
transaction price, and negative if there is a quote reversal. The definition is symmetric for a seller-
initiated order sequence. We compute variants of C where the bid and offer quotes employed are 
those prevailing 1, 5 and 10 minutes after the trade. 
Table 11 presents means and mean standard errors for the continuations for all order 
sequences. For each firm, continuations are positive and statistically significantly so. This 
suggests that quotes deteriorate with the passage of time subsequent to a trade. This is in part 
due to cancellation of limit orders that establish the best quote. Immediately after a transaction, 
the stock is automatically requoted. We examined quote revisions that occurred pursuant to 
these. In 134 instances a quote revision was the first event (ignoring the automatic requoting) 
after an order sequence that involved a trade. In 106 of these cases the quote deteriorated, 
presumably as a result of cancellations. That quote deterioration is sometimes observed 
subsequent to the completion such order sequences, but never in the face of warning quotes 
issued while the sequence is in progress, suggests that cancellation may be difficult in the latter 
case. Overall, quote revisions in the absence of intervening trades are relatively infrequent. The 
continuations in Table 11 are also likely to result from the aforementioned positive 
autocorrelation in the order flow. A trade in one direction is likely to be followed by another that 
will cause additional movement in the quote. 
We also categorized the quote continuations according to whether or not the transaction or 
transactions in the sequence took place at a single price. The sequences that are executed at 
multiple prices are precisely those which stem from orders working through the book. The results 
here are more ambiguous. Orders filled at a single price exhibit continuations. Those filled at 
multiple prices tend to. exhibit reversals (statistically significant only in the case of JAL). This 
suggests that liquidity may be restored subsequent to large trades. 
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5. Conclusions. 
This paper investigates the properties of intraday trades and quotes on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE). In comparison with most of the world's other principal equity markets, the TSE 
is distinctive in the absence of dealers. In addition, the TSE employs price limits and order 
handling procedures that delay adjustment in quotes and invite liquidity suppliers. 
We examine three stocks with average trading volume in the top third of TSE first section 
issues for the first three months of 1990, a relatively volatile period. For these firms, the supply of 
public liquidity is good. Ignoring opening delays, hypothetical small buy or sell orders would be 
prevented from immediately executing (due to the absence of an acceptable opposing quote) less 
than 5% of the time that the TSE is nominally open. Under TSE procedures transactions that 
would otherwise walk through the limit order book at a succession of deteriorating prices are 
held, and indicative ("special" or "warning") quotes are issued. Roughly a fifth of the time, these 
indicative quotes are hit by competing providers of liquidity, obtaining some price improvement 
for the original order. 
A dynamic VAR analysis of trades and quote revisions suggests that holding order size 
constant, an order that is held with an indicative quote has a larger cumulative price impact than 
one that is immediately executed in full. This suggests that the price limits do not merely smooth 
transient liquidity effects, but are also associated with changes in the market depth. Finally, after 
a market order is executed, the quote hit by the market order generally tends to continue to move 
in the same direction. This is due in part to order autocorrelation and in part to the cancellation 
of limit orders. This last effect is consistent with the behavior of traders on the Paris CAC system 
described by BHS and suggests asymmetric information effects within the limit order book. 
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Notes 
^ e prohibition against members acting as dealers is not a formal Exchange rule. Instead, it appears 
to derive from a members' committee directive that restricts members proprietary trades associated 
with price changes. This directive has generally been interpreted as prohibiting two-sided market 
making. In recent years, however, the prohibition has become less effective, as proprietary trading has 
become more widespread and monitoring has become more difficult. 
2See Hamao (1991, 1992) for details on the distinction between the first and second sections. 
3
 Although NYSE Rule 79 requires floor offical approval for large price changes (one dollar if the 
share price is under twenty dollars and two dollars if over), this circumstance is relatively rare. 
4Intraday patterns in U.S. data are discussed by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990, 1993), Harris (1986, 1989), Jain and Joh (1988), Mclnish and Wood (1992), 
Mulherin and Gerety (1989), and Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985). Lehmann and Modest (1994) 
also document intraday patterns in Japanese equity transactions data. 
5The delivery and settlement occurs on the third business day after the transaction ("T+3"). 
6
 Lehmann and Modest find a number of instances in which an order was permitted to walk 
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TSE Tick Sizes and Maximum Price Variations (¥ per Share). 
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Table 2 
Evolution of the Limit Order Book: An Example. 
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Times With Impaired Liquidity. 
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Table 6. 
Description of Order 
Page 33 
Notes: an order sequence is a consecutive group of trade and quote events that may be inferred to 
have arisen from one or more orders. The start of an active order sequence in the buy direction is 
indicated by a transaction above the current bid quote or a quote that improves on the current bid. 
In the case of a transaction, the sequence immediately terminates if a normal bid quote is 
immediately posted. Otherwise, if a warning or special bid is posted, the sequence is presumed to 
continue until a normal bid is posted or the trading session ends. The diagram reports the number 
and types of these sequences. Sequences that possessed at least one warning quote are classified 
according to whether a warning quote in the sequence was hit (and similarly for special quotes). 
Parentheses contain counts (number of such events in the sample) and average sequence 
durations. The sample for the three stocks is January through March of 1990. 
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Table 7. 
The Outcomes of Warning and Special Quotes. 
Page 35 
Table 8. 
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Table 11. 
Transaction Price/Quote Continuations. 
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Figure 3. 
Average Intraday Spread. 
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Figure 4. 
Intraday Trading Volume, 
